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PIRACY IN SOMALIA 811 will focus on the legal enforcement issues related to the targeting of pirate networks and the prosecution of pirate negotiators and higher-ranking pirates whose crimes are typically categorized as "white-collar." These white-collar pirates are responsible for providing funding, organizational tools, and political capital. 12 Legal enforcement, or the use of effective legal prosecution and incarceration to deter piracy, appears to be working to some degree: in 2011, for example, there were more than 1,000 pirates in custody in twenty countries around the world. 13 However, not all experts find these numbers convincing-some experts note that as many as nine out of ten pirates captured by States patrolling international waters will be released without being prosecuted. 14 In a 2011 report on legal issues related to piracy off the coast of Somalia, Special Adviser Jack Lang noted that there has been increased development and sophistication within piracy networks. 15 In particular, the ability of pirate networks to marshal logistical support for the negotiation of ransoms and the holding of hostages has enabled a larger number of captures and thereby provided networks with a consistent source of revenue. 16 Irrespective of the number of ships captured, or the economic ramifications of piracy, one conclusion seems clear: "[p]iracy has gone from a fairly ad hoc disorganized criminal endeavor to a highly developed transnational criminal enterprise." 17
B. The Role of Pirate Negotiators and Pirate Facilitators in the Scourge of Piracy
In some respects, the act of piracy itself has remained unchanged over time: "whether using swords or rocket propelled grenades, a galleon or a fastboat, a sextant or GPS, pirates will always be looking for easy targets and easy profit." 18 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries pirates may have plundered a ship's cargo for an easy profit; today however, human crews are equally valuable because of the availability and willingness of ship owners to pay ransoms. 19 As a result, pirate networks have made increasing use of pirate negotiators, or '"interpreters,'" to ensure successful 812 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
[Vol. 24:3 ransom transactions. 20 Using cell phones and satellite phones, pirate negotiators serve as the liaisons between the owners of hijacked ships and pirate bosses. 21 Often pirate negotiators serve as the interpreter for several ships, and in some cases may even provide negotiation services to multiple pirate networks simultaneously. 22 Negotiators must possess the foreign language skills-especially in the English language-to communicate with the ship's owners; moreover, they must possess the intangible social skills necessary to reconcile the interests of all the parties involved to procure a ransom. 23 The ransom agreements have become increasingly costly for the owners of captured victim ships-based on available data, the OEF calculated statistics for 2011 and concluded that thirty-one ransoms were paid for a total of $159.62 million with an average ransom payment of $4.97 million. 24 Pirate negotiators are well compensated for their servicesin fact, a negotiator typically receives twice the share of a regular pirate guard. 25 In addition to the salary a negotiator receives from his or her boss, some negotiators are able to procure additional, secret funds by having the shipping company wire them money directly into a foreign account. 26 For example, one particularly notorious pirate negotiator, Looyaan Si'id Barte, reportedly served as a negotiator in twenty pirate attacks between January 2009 and April 2011. 27 Based on a report from the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, Looyaan received an estimated $500,000 for his negotiation services during that period of time. 28 Other high-ranking, white-collar pirates also play a pivotal role in the piracy model. As a practical matter, the Somali hijack-for-ransom business model only exists insofar as pirate networks have consistent shore locations to anchor the captive ships during ransom negotiations. 29 Access to space on the Somali coast is necessary to protect captive ships from national and international law enforcement as well as rival piracy groups. 30 In exchange for anchorage locations, Somali pirates typically must pay an anchorage fee to local insurgent groups, or bribe the local government. 31 32 It is estimated that commanders and instigators in Somali piracy business split 70 to 86 percent of piracy proceeds with these stakeholders, without support of whom anchorage of hijacked boats would not be feasible." 33 Generally speaking then, the category of individuals who facilitate acts of piracy, whether directly or indirectly, is very broad. It includes not only those individuals who instigate and command piracy operations, but also those who supply political capital 34 and share profits with the pirates themselves. A staggering majority of the piracy profits-up to an estimated 86 percent-end up compensating the individuals who supply political capital. 35 Certainly the ability of international forces to prosecute pirate negotiators, as well as those who provide political capital to pirate networks, would begin to address the root of the piracy problem rather than the symptoms. This recognition has led to increased efforts to combat piracy at its source. 36 For example, Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia created Working Group 5 which, under the guidance of Italy, "coordinates international efforts to identify and disrupt the financial networks of pirate leaders and their financiers." 37 Regional efforts have also culminated in the creation of the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions and Intelligence Co-ordination Centre (RAPPICC) located near Victoria in Seychelles. 38 The Centre will seek to separate pirate foot soldiers from the 32. PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, supra note 7, at xxiv. 33. PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, supra note 7, at xxiv, xxv. 34. PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, supra note 7, at 7 (including officials, militia commanders, religious leaders, members of local communities, clan representatives).
35. PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, supra note 7, at 8. "After carefully calibrating the returns to labor and capital that compensate participants for high risks involved in pirate ventures, it was found that up to 86 percent of ransom proceeds go to remunerate individuals, inside and outside the industry, whose political and social connections allow Somali piracy to thrive." PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, supra note 7, at 8. 36 . Thomas Kelly Remarks, supra note 8; see also S.C. Res. 2020, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011) ("Recognizing the need to investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who illicitly plan, organize, facilitate, or finance and profit from such attacks . . . .") (alteration added). 37. Working Group 5, CONTACT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, http://www.thecgpcs.org/work.do?action=workAd (last visited Nov. 3, 2012, archived at http://perma.cc/TSE3-BDWC) (Working Group 5 has worked with INTERPOL to develop a customized Piracy database designed to provide information to law enforcement agencies across the globe as a means of facilitating piracy investigations); Thomas Kelly Remarks, supra note 8.
38. Thomas Kelly Remarks, supra note 8; see also Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions and Intelligence Co-ordination Centre (RAPPICC), OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/activity/regional-anti-piracy-prosecutions-intelligenceco-ordination-centre-rappicc (last visited Nov. 5, 2012, archived at http://perma.cc/FZE4- [Vol. 24:3 higher-ups; indeed, RAPPICC will focus its efforts on facilitating the capture and prosecution of financers, investors, instigators, and ringleaders involved in Somali piracy. 39 The United States, too, has increased efforts to disrupt pirate networks and prosecute high-ranking pirates. As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton opined, "we may be dealing with a 17th century crime, but we need to bring 21st century solutions to bear." 40 In an effort to make kidnappings less profitable for pirates, the United States has begun to prosecute midlevel pirate negotiators. Highlighting this effort are the recent prosecutions of two pirate negotiators: Mohammad Saaili Shibin and Ali Mohamed Ali.
On April 13, 2011, Mohammad Saaili Shibin had his initial appearance in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia after his arrest in Somalia and extradition to the United States. 41 On August 13, 2012, Shibin received ten concurrent and two consecutive life sentences from a US federal court for his role as a negotiator in the hijacking of the German-owned M/V/ Marida Marguerite and the Quest, a US-flagged vessel with four US citizens aboard. 42 Following these convictions, Shibin filed an appeal with the US Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 43 In his appeal, Shibin argued that his convictions should be overturned because he never negotiated while personally on the high seas. 44 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that "conduct violating Article 101(c) does not have to be carried out on the high seas, but it must incite or intentionally facilitate acts committed against ships, persons, and property on the high seas." 45 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit upheld Shibin's conviction. 46 The second case commenced in April of 2011 when Ali Mohamed Ali was arrested at Dulles International Airport as he made his way to an education conference. 47 Later that month, on April 29th, a grand jury M784).
39. Thomas Kelly Remarks, supra note 8; see also 49 At the district court level, Judge Ellen Huevelle granted, in part, Ali's motion to dismiss charges of aiding and abetting piracyruling that such conduct is limited to events that occur on the high seas. 50 Ali has yet to stand trial for any piracy charges; however, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that Ali could be charged as a pirate notwithstanding the fact that his acts of facilitating piracy likely did not occur on the high seas. 51
C. The Current Issues Associated with the Prosecution of High-Ranking Pirates
The arrests and subsequent prosecutions of both Shibin and Ali are novel in two respects. First, both cases involve the prosecution of individuals serving as negotiators, a role that the United States has not sought to prosecute before 2011. 52 According to US Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia Neil H. MacBridge, Shibin's arrest marks the first time that the US government has prosecuted an alleged pirate acting in a leadership role as a hostage negotiator. 53 Second, Ali's case marks the first time that the US government has relied solely on universal jurisdiction to prosecute a Somali pirate. 54 At the district court level, the Shibin and Ali cases produced seemingly divergent results. Indeed, facing charges that would carry a mandatory life sentence, Ali was released on bail after a contentious status hearing conducted on July 20, 2012, drawing a bemused remark from one commentator: '"I can't think of any case in U.S. history or in any other Somali pirate trial in the world where an alleged pirate has negotiating-ransom-of-danish-ship, archived at http://perma.cc/ZZ95-F7Y6.
48 This Note attempts to provide some background to US efforts to prosecute pirate negotiators and high-ranking pirates. It dissects the arguments surrounding the question of whether acts of negotiation must themselves be committed on the high seas-referred to throughout this Note as the "high seas" 58 requirement. 59 Part II begins with the piracy provision in the US Constitution and traces its evolution through legislative enactments and case law. Part III examines the international framework governing the law of piracy to determine the "law of nations" definition of piracy as referred to in 18 U. Finally, informed by the discussion of the Shibin and Ali cases, Part V discusses this Note's recommendations. This Note concedes that, as a matter of law, it is likely permissible to charge and prosecute individuals who facilitate acts of piracy, but never themselves enter the high seas. However, this Note cautions against pursuing such prosecutions. Instead of prosecuting pirate facilitators in US federal courts, this Note recommends that the United States defer to the international community to prosecute pirate negotiators and facilitators. First, this position is supported by the rationales underlying the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Second, deferring to the international community to prosecute high-ranking pirates would foster respect for Somali territorial jurisdiction by enhancing predictability and preventing the slippery slope towards potentially absurd prosecutions. Simply put, using US federal courts to prosecute high-ranking Somali pirates is not a sustainable anti-piracy model.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PIRACY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Piracy under The US Constitution: The "Define and Punish" Clause
Article I of the US Constitution vests power with the US Congress "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations." 60 Clause ten addresses three discrete classes of crimes: "universal jurisdiction (piracies), extraterritorial crimes (felonies on the high seas), and violations of international law." 61 As commentators have argued, the history and text of clause ten suggest that piracy was considered a unique crime precisely because it was subject to universal jurisdiction. 62 On its face, it seems odd that the language of clause ten would use both "piracies" and "felonies" because in 1776 the term "felony" would have included the entire category of crimes labeled "piracy." 63 Therefore, it is significant that the drafters 64 of clause ten used the terms "piracies" and "felonies," and thereby created a "double redundancy." 65 )) (noting that "felony at common law" was a vague term, but not so with piracy, and referring to historic statutes on the subject).
65. Kontorovich, supra note 61, at 160 ("By the late seventeenth century, felony had come to mean any very serious crime, especially those punishable by death." (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 71 (writing that statutes have made piracy a [Vol. 24:3 Constitutional construction requires giving each word meaning, if "Offenses" and "Felonies" were categorically equivalent to "Piracies,"then the word "Piracies" would be rendered superfluous. 66 That is to say, if all "piracies" could be referred to as "felonies," then use of the word "piracies" would be meaningless-an interpretation that does not comport with a fundamental tenant of constitutional construction: words have meaning. Constitutional interpretation requires interpreting the language from clause ten as having some non-redundant meaning; as commentators have observed, it requires inquiry into why the Constitution might treat piracy differently from other felonies and other offenses against the law of nations. 67 The fundamental difference between "piracies" and "felonies" and "other offenses" is that piracy has a unique jurisdictional scope.
In The Federalist 42, James Madison briefly addressed the respective categories of "piracies," felonies on the high seas," and "offenses against the law of nations." 68 Madison briefly discussed the meaning of "piracies" which appears to simply anticipate the establishment of courts. 69 He provided the following comments:
The provision of the federal articles on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these offenses. The definition of piracies might, perhaps, without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations; though a legislative definition of them is found in most municipal codes. 70 Madison was able to provide a more concrete definition of "felonies on the high seas":
Felony is a term of loose signification, even in the common law of England; and of various import in the statute law of that kingdom. But neither the common nor the statute law of that, or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this, unless previously made its own by legislative adoption. The meaning of the term, as defined in the codes of the several States, would be as impracticable as the former would be a dishonorable and illegitimate guide. It is not precisely the same in any two of the States; and varies in each with every revision of its criminal laws. 
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For the sake of certainty and uniformity, therefore, the power of defining felonies in this case was in every respect necessary and proper. 71 Finally, regarding offenses against the law of nations, Madison had the following to say: "These articles contain no provision for the case of offenses against the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations." 72
Traditional Sources of Jurisdiction
There are four traditional theories of jurisdiction under the law of nations: territorial, national, passive personality, and protective jurisdiction. 73 Territorial jurisdiction-the most essential manifestation of state sovereignty-allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over conduct occurring within its own territory, or on ships that it has registered. 74 States, however, may also exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. The national principle for jurisdiction allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over the conduct of its own nationals even if such conduct occurs outside its own territory; similarly, the passive personality theory allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over individuals who commit criminal acts against its citizens. 75 The national principle and the passive personality theory are inversely related-the national theory conditions jurisdiction on the nationality of the criminal actor; conversely, the passive personality theory conditions jurisdiction on the nationality of the victim. 76 Finally, under the protective principle for jurisdiction, a state may exercise jurisdiction over conduct outside its territory that is directed against a critical state interest. 77 For example, an anti-trust conspiracy directed against a state's interest would likely constitute a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction under the protective 71 The crime of piracy, from as early as the seventeenth century, was considered a crime with a unique jurisdictional scope. 79 In large part, the unique jurisdictional scope of piracy comes from a bifurcated meaning of the very term "piracy." 80 In one sense, "piracy" can mean general piracy, as it relates to a crime under public international law. 81 In a different sense, the term "piracy" can refer to a crime under municipal law. 82 General piracy is piracy in violation of the law of nations, whereas municipal piracy is piracy in violation of some State's domestic law. 83 In this Note, municipal piracy will refer to the US domestic piracy provision contained in section 1651. Use of the term piracy in the general piracy sense comes from the historic notion that piracy is a crime subject to universal jurisdiction. 84 Indeed, pirates have traditionally been referred to as "hostis humani generis," a phrase meaning "common enemies of all mankind." 85 Since the early seventeenth century, piracy has been considered the only universal jurisdiction offense. 86 General piracy, as an international crime, grants all States jurisdiction over the pirate, regardless of where the pirate was captured, so long as it was on the high seas. 87 There are at least two main rationales for allowing universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy. The first rationale relies on a logical connection between the crime of piracy and the geographical location of 78 Second, pirates, by definition, do not serve the interests of any home country; consequently, no government will protest if another country seeks to prosecute individuals caught in the act of piracy. 90 Other commentators have articulated this rationale in a slightly different way: when individuals commit acts of piracy they lose their nationality by their very acts-they become "de-nationalized." 91 A pirate who has been de-nationalized can no longer be subjected to the national jurisdiction of his or her former state of nationality; thus, other countries must be able to assert jurisdiction to fill this jurisdictional void. 92 Regardless of the rationale, the essence of universal jurisdiction remains largely the same: pirates do not have allegiance to any one State, and because they harm the interests of multiple States, they are considered to be the enemy of all States. 93
B. US Municipal Piracy Laws
US municipal piracy, on the other hand, can consist of virtually any offense the US Congress chooses to define through statute; however, it is possible for a crime to be labeled "piracy" under municipal law but still not be a crime subject to universal jurisdiction. 94 In other words, labeling a crime "piracy" does not automatically qualify that crime as one subject to universal jurisdiction. 95 A State may only invoke universal jurisdiction over general piracy when its municipal statute reflects the definition of piracy derived from international consensus. 96 conduct piracy, but that State only obtains universal jurisdiction over the conduct when it is also defined by the law of nations as piracy. For example, the US Congress could codify a crime with the elements of common law battery and call it "piracy;" but labeling the crime "piracy" would not give US courts jurisdiction over foreigners who commit batteries on the high seas. Universal jurisdiction only arises to the extent that the US municipal statute and the "law of nations" overlap. 97
The Act of 1790
On April 30, 1790, Congress passed its first substantive piracy provision. 98 Congress passed the Act of 1790 "for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States." 99 Section 8 of the Act dealt specifically with the crime of piracy, providing:
That if any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, murder or robbery, or any other offence which if committed within the body of a county, would by the laws of the United States be punishable with death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically and feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship or goods committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and being thereof convicted, shall suffer death. . . . 100 Section 8 can be divided into three different classes of piracy, each with a distinct definition. 101 All three definitions, however, penalize the crime of piracy with a sentence of death. 102 The first class of piracy discussed in section 8 includes "any persons" who commit acts of piracy The second class includes "any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel." 104 Finally, the third class includes "any seaman" who "shall lay violent hands upon his commander." 105 The section 8 definition of piracy appeared to recognize the applicability of universal jurisdiction to the crime of piracy for the prosecution of individuals from any country; however, the failure of section 8 to criminalize piracy consistent with international law limited its jurisdictional scope. 106 Indeed, the problems with section 8 of the Act of 1790 became evident in the Supreme Court case of United States v. Palmer which will be discussed infra in Part C. 107
The Congressional Act of 1819
On March 3, 1819, the year after the United States v. Palmer decision, Congress passed the Congressional Act of 1819. 108 The Act of 1819 was a Congressional Act "to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish the crime of piracy." 109 Section 5 of the Act of 1819 dealt with piracy in particular, criminalizing the following acts:
That if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and such offender or offenders, shall afterwards be brought into or found in the United States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon conviction thereof, before the circuit court of the United States for the district into which he or they may be brought, or in which he or they shall be found, be punished with death. 110 The initial Act of 1819 was limited in time to one year, but was other offence which if committed within the body of a county, would by the laws of the United States be punishable with death . . . ." Act of 1790, supra note 98 (alteration added).
104. "[O]r if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically and feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate . . . ." Act of 1790, supra note 98 (alterations added).
105. "[O]r if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship or goods committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and being thereof convicted, shall suffer death; and the trial of crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought." Act of 1790, supra note 98 (alteration added The Act of 1819 marked a shift from a specific definition of piracy, as initially enunciated in the 1790 Act, to a definition of piracy by reference to the "law of nations." 112 Under the 1790 Act a crime of robbery-committed by a person on the high seas, on board a foreign vessel, and against a person from a foreign state-would not have qualified as piracy within the statutory definition. In other words, the Act of 1790 limited the power of US courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over individuals deemed to be pirates by virtue of the "law of nations." The 1819 Act, by reference to the "law of nations," ameliorated problems with the 1790 Act by expanding the US municipal statute to track international developments in the definition of piracy. 113
The Act of 1820
In 1820, Congress reenacted the Act of 1819 as "[a]n act to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish the crime of piracy." 114 Section 2 of the 1820 Act largely replicated section 5 of the 1819 Act by reinstating that section; section 2 provided "[t]hat the fifth section of the said act [of 1819] be, and the same is hereby continued in force, as to all crimes made punishable by the same, and heretofore committed, in all respects or fully as if the duration of the said section had been without limitation." 115 In addition, section 3 of the Act of 1820 explicitly addressed piracy in the following way:
That, if any person shall, upon the high seas, or in any open roadstead, or in any haven, basin, or bay, or in any river 111. RUBIN, supra note, 82, at 144-45 (citing Act May 25, 1820, ch. 113, 3 Stat. 600,16th Cong., 1st Sess.).
112. RUBIN, supra note, 82, at 145. 113. The court in United States v. Chapels referred to the Act of 1790 as containing an omission, therefore requiring an additional congressional statute to amend the problem: "To supply this omission, a new provision was deemed to be necessary; and it is understood, that with this intention the last congress adopted the 5th section of the 'act to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish the crime of piracy, ' . It provided that section 5 of the Act of 1819 should be "continued in force" without limitation as to time "as to all crimes made punishable by the same, and heretofore committed." RUBIN, supra note 82, at 381. Notably, the Act of 1820 made it "piracy" for an American to be engaged in the international slave trade which presumably represented an attempt "to develop the international law, the 'law of nations,' by changing the municipal law of the United States, with the goal that the international community would reciprocate; however, to that extent it failed." Id. at 163.
115. RUBIN, supra note 82, at 381.
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where the sea ebbs and flows, commit the crime of robbery, in or upon any ship or vessel, or upon any of the ship's company of any ship or vessel, or the lading thereof, such person shall be adjudged to be a pirate: and, being thereof convicted before the circuit court of the United States for the district into which he shall be brought, or in which he shall be found, shall suffer death. And if any person engaged in any piratical cruise or enterprise, or being of the crew or ship's company of any piratical ship or vessel, shall land from such ship or vessel, and, on shore, shall commit robbery, such person shall be adjudged a pirate: and on conviction thereof before the circuit court of the United States for the district into which he shall be brought, or in which he shall be found, shall suffer death:
Provided, That nothing in this section contained shall be construed to deprive any particular state of its jurisdiction over such offences, when committed within the body of a county, or authorize the courts of the United States to try any such offenders, after conviction or acquittance, for the same offence, in a state court. 116 Commentators note that, based on the language contained in section 3, Congress likely intended section 5 of the Act of 1819 to supersede section 8 of the Act of 1790; 117 moreover, section 3 of the Act of 1820 was likely intended to supersede section 5 of the Act of 1819. 118 The combination of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 1651 provides the federal statutory basis for charging pirate negotiators and facilitators as principals.
C. The Early US Piracy Cases
United States v. Palmer
The US Supreme Court first interpreted a congressional enactment of a piracy provision in United States v. Palmer. 126 In Palmer the Supreme Court interpreted the Act of 1790 and consequently delineated, for the first time, the meets and bounds of piracy under congressional enactment. 127 The issues before the Palmer Court were twofold: first, the Court had to decide whether Congress intended for actions that would constitute robbery on land, but were committed on the high seas, to be considered piracy. 128 Second, the Court decided whether section 8 of the Act of 1790, which labeled as piracy "robbery" and "murder" committed by "any person or persons" on the high seas, could be considered piracy when it was applied to a non-US citizen on the high seas on a vessel belonging to the subject of a foreign State. 129 In essence, the Palmer Court came to two conclusions regarding the Act of 1790. Regarding the first issue: piracy was the act of robbery, as 123 
United States v. Smith
In 1820, the US Supreme Court decided United States v. Smith; the Court considered the Act of 1819 to determine whether "plunder and robbery" constituted piracy by the law of nations, punishable under section 5 of the Act of 1819. 133 The defendant in Smith had confined the officer of a ship commissioned by the government of Buenos Aires while in port, and then robbed the vessel while on the high seas. 134 The defendant was captured and charged with piracy under section 5 of the Act of 1819. 135 Consequently, the issue before the Court was whether section 5, relying on the "law of nations" for a definition of piracy, was a proper exercise of congressional authority under the "define and punish" clause of the Constitution. 136 Unlike the piracy proscription contained in the Act of 1790, the piracy proscription in the Act of 1819 criminalized piracy through specific reference to the "law of nations." 137 Therefore, the Court held that an act punishing "the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations," was within Congress's constitutional authority to "define and punish" since it adopted by reference the sufficiently precise definition of piracy under international law: the act of "robbery upon the sea." 138 In other words, Justice Story reasoned that the explicit reference to the law of nations was tantamount to listing the elements of piracy clearly within the statute. Next, the Court considered what crimes constituted piracy under the "law of nations." 140 It considered three sources to determine how the law of nations defined piracy. The Court considered "the works of jurists, . . . the general usage and practice of nations . . . , [and] . . . judicial decisions recgonising and enforcing [the law of nations on piracy]." 141 The Court concluded that there was sufficient agreement that "robbery, or forcible depredations upon the seas, animo furandi, is piracy;" therefore, it concluded that the reference to the law of nations in section 5 of the Act of 1819 was proper. 142
III. THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW DEFINITION OF PIRACY: THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING PIRACY
Commentators generally agree that the definition of piracy under the "law of nations" is found in UNCLOS. 143 This Note addresses two main reasons for this conclusion. First, the UNCLOS definition embodied in article 101 has gained wide acceptance by the international community. Second, recent US case law corroborates the view that UNCLOS article 101 provides the law of nations definition of piracy.
The international community appears to have accepted the UNCLOS article 101 definition of piracy. 144 In 2011 the United States drafted UN Resolution 2020, which reaffirmed that UNCLOS sets forth the legal framework for prosecuting piracy and armed robbery at sea as well as regulating other ocean activities. 145 Resolution 2020, therefore, provides strong evidence that the international community relies on UNCLOS article 101 for the current international definition of piracy. 146 Second, US case law seems to endorse US acceptance of the piracy definition set forth in UNCLOS, as well as the High Seas Convention before it. 147 In concluding that UNCLOS provides the current definition of piracy under the law of nations, the Dire court largely adopted the rationale from United States v. Hasan. 149 In Hasan, the court noted that treaties could create legal obligations on the States that are parties to them. 150 As the Hasan court put it, "a treaty will only constitute sufficient proof of a norm of customary international law if an overwhelming majority of states have ratified the treaty, and those states uniformly and consistently act in accordance with its principles." 151 The Hasan court, however, went on to state that "it is also important to understand that a treaty can either 'embod[y] or create[ ] a rule of customary international law,' and such a rule 'applies beyond the limited subject matter of the treaty and to nations that have not ratified it. '" 152 Considering the general acceptance of UNCLOS, the Hasan court concluded that UNCLOS's definition of piracy represented a "widely accepted norm." 153 It reasoned that "[t]he 161 states parties to UNCLOS represent the 'overwhelming majority' of the 192 Member States of the United Nations, and the 194 countries recognized by the United States Department of State." 154 The United States did not pursue ratification of UNCLOS in the 1980s or 1990s based on concerns about the deep seabed mining provisions. 155 However, it is not dispositive for the US's determination of "piracy" that the United States has not signed or ratified UNCLOS because the United States has acceded to the provisions regarding "traditional uses" of the ocean. 156 Indeed, in a transmittal letter, President Bill Clinton addressed the US Senate stating that "Articles 100-107 reaffirm the rights and obligations of all states to suppress piracy on the high seas;" he also emphasized that Congress had exercised its constitutional power to criminalize piracy through Section 1651. 157 Consequently, both international agreement and US case law interpreting international consensus appear in harmony that UNCLOS article 101 provides the current law of nations definition of piracy for purposes of 18 The current "law of nations" definition of piracy is contained in UNCLOS article 101; 159 however, the textual lineage of UNCLOS dates back to the High Seas Convention, and even further to the Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy before that. 160 Consequently, an overview of these predecessor statutes helps provide the necessary context for a discussion of the current piracy provisions contained in the text of UNCLOS article 101.
Piracy Under the Harvard Research in International Law Draft Convention on Piracy
Published in 1932, The Harvard Draft Convention was an effort to consider the international law of piracy in preparation for a major codification, and the creation of a special jurisdiction for sea piracy. 161 Although not an international agreement itself, the Harvard Draft Convention anticipated future codification-thus, it was intended "as an aid to the attempts of the time to 'codify' the rules of international law as they ought to exist rather than as they could be shown to exist by an examination of theory and past practice." 162 To this end, article 2 provides that "[e]very state has jurisdiction to prevent piracy and to seize and punish persons and to seize and dispose of property because of piracy." 163 Indeed, the very theme of the draft was to define the meets and bounds of the universal jurisdiction over pirates. 164 The 
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Piracy is any of the following acts, committed in a place not within the territorial jurisdiction of any state: 1. Any act of violence or of depredation committed with intent to rob, rape, wound, enslave, imprison or kill a person or with intent to steal or destroy property, for private ends without bona fide purpose of asserting a claim of right, provided that the act is connected with an attack on or from the sea or in or from the air. If the act is connected with an attack which starts from on board ship, either that ship or another ship which is involved must be a pirate ship or a ship without national character. 2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge of facts which make it a pirate ship. 3. Any act of instigation or of intentional facilitation of an act described in paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of this article. 165 Furthermore, article 6 limits jurisdiction to areas not within the territorial jurisdiction of a State by providing, "[i]n a place not within the territorial jurisdiction of another state, a state may seize a pirate ship or a ship taken by piracy and possessed by pirates, and things or persons on board." 166 Based on article 1, territorial jurisdiction is "the jurisdiction of a state under international law over its land, its territorial waters and the air above its land and territorial waters. The term does not include the jurisdiction of a state over its ships outside its territory." 167 On the other hand, the "high seas" were defined as "that part of the seas which is not included in the territorial waters of any state." 168
Piracy under the Geneva Convention on the High Seas
Created in 1958, the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (the High Seas Convention) serves as the first prominent international treaty governing the crime of piracy. The United Nations General Assembly asked the International Law Commission to draft a document that could form the predicate for an international agreement on the law of the sea-the result was the High Seas Convention. 169 The High Seas Convention appears to have been intended as a declarative authority on customary international law at the time of its inception. 170 [Vol. 24:3 total of sixty-three states as parties, including the United States, which ratified the treaty on April 12, 1961. 171 Article 15 of the High Seas Convention contains the definition of piracy; as will be discussed infra, its language is virtually identical to the definition of piracy contained in UNCLOS article 101.
Turning to the text of article 15 of the High Seas Convention, piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; Any act of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 1 or subparagraph 2 of this article. 172 Finally, article 19 clearly establishes universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy. It provides:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state, every state may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the state which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the property, subject to the rights of third states acting in good faith. 173 Much of the language from UNCLOS unmistakably resembles the language from the High Seas Convention. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The third United Nations Conference on the Sea convened in 1973. Resulting from the Conference was UNCLOS, which was a multilateral treaty adopted in 1982. 175 Currently, 166 states have ratified or acceded to the terms of UNCLOS. 176 The United States, however, has neither signed nor ratified its terms. 177 Article 101 provides the relevant definition of piracy which consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State: (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). 178 Furthermore, article 105 of UNCLOS virtually replicates article 19 of the High Seas Convention and reaffirms the applicability of universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy. 179 Finally, a ship becomes a pirate ship under article 103 "if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101." 180 Based on the language of UNCLOS article 101, an act is piratical if the following four elements are proven: (a) a specified criminal "act" (b) 175 First, piracy under UNCLOS article 101 requires the commission of some specific "act." Article 101 essentially creates three categories of acts that would satisfy this requirement. 183 Subsection (a) defines as piracy "illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation." 184 Subsection (b) goes further to include "voluntary participation" or "operation" of a ship that is used to commit acts of piracy. 185 Finally, subsection (c) would include as piracy "inciting" or "facilitating" acts of violence or detention against a ship. 186 Also included within each category are the mere acts of preparation or attempts at the acts themselves. 187
b. Private Ends Requirement
Second, an act must be "committed for private ends." 188 The text of UNCLOS does not expressly define "private ends" and it remains somewhat unclear what the "private ends" requirement actually mandates. 189 Commentators have interpreted the ambiguity in two divergent ways. Some commentators have interpreted this requirement narrowly by arguing that the "private ends" requirement would only be met if the acts are not taken for political reasons. 190 Other commentators have interpreted the "private ends" requirement to encompass a larger category of activity; these commentators suggest that that the "private ends" requirement would not be met only when a government expressly authorizes the acts. 191 This 181. This element will be discussed in more detail in Part IV. However, it is important to note that the UNCLOS definition of piracy only includes acts that occur outside of a state's territorial jurisdiction which may extend twelve miles from its coastline. UNCLOS, supra note 58, arts. 
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PIRACY IN SOMALIA 835 second interpretation is broader because any act of violence that is not expressly sanctioned by a state would meet the "private ends" requirement if it had any political underpinning. 192 Nevertheless, it is conceivable that in the future, pirates could argue that their actions are politically motivated; if courts interpret the "private ends" requirement narrowly, then it is possible that the "private ends" requirement could exculpate some pirates. 193
c. High Seas Requirement
Third, piracy under article 101 must occur on the "high seas," or "in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State." 194 The "high seas" requirement, which is particularly relevant to this Note, is referenced in UNCLOS article 3. Article 3 provides, "[e]very State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention." 195 Commentators agree that acts that fulfill all of the requirements contained in UNCLOS article 101, but that occur within a state's territorial jurisdiction are not considered piracy. 196 The "high seas" requirement, as it relates to the prosecution of pirate negotiators, will be discussed in more detail infra in Part IV.
d. Two Ships Requirement
Finally, because article 101(a)(i) includes the language "against another ship" there is a requirement that, for a conviction under article 101, an act of piracy must occur between two ships. 197 Although some commentators may disagree as to what the two ships requirement really means, there is a good body of scholarship indicating that piracy does not consist of "crew seizures, mutiny or passenger takeovers of one and the same vessel . . . ." 198 Indeed, the two-ship requirement contained in UNCLOS article 101 appears to be one of the primary motivations for adopting the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the [S] tating that treaty language and the preparatory papers support a conclusion that the two ship requirement is meant to screen out mutiny or other internal disturbances by crew and passengers, whose acts would remain within the jurisdiction of the flag state to prosecute.") (alteration added)). [Vol. 24:3 Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention). 199 The SUA Convention was adopted in reaction to acts of maritime terrorism that occurred entirely on board one ship-the Palestinian hijacking of the Italian cruise liner the Achille Lauro is the paradigm. 200 Unlike UNCLOS article 101, which requires two ships, article 3 of the SUA Convention prohibits both acts of intentional seizure and control of a ship and acts of violence against persons on board the ship, as well as attempts to engage in those acts. 201 Thus, while an offense under the SUA Convention may arise out of acts committed entirely on one ship, UNCLOS article 101 requires a showing that two or more ships have been involved. 202 
IV. ANALYSIS OF WHETHER THE ACT OF NEGOTIATING CONSTITUTES PIRACY UNDER THE "LAW OF NATIONS"
As discussed supra in Part III, UNCLOS article 101 provides the current "law of nations" definition of piracy for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1651. Under UNCLOS article 101(a)-(b), "any illegal act of violence or detention," or "any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship" satisfies the "act" requirement for a crime of piracy under UNCLOS 101. 203 Article 101(c) also includes "any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)." 204 The current US cases of United States v. Shibin and United States v. Ali help define the scope of the high seas requirement under article 101.
In both United States v. Shibin and United States v. Ali the "private ends" and the "two ships" requirements are not at issue. 205 In Shibin there was no dispute that Mohammad Shibin did "incit[e]" or "intentionally facilitat[e]" acts of violence by negotiating ransom agreements. 206 Assuming Ali also "intentionally facilitated" acts of violence, the only remaining issue, at least when looking at US law to help determine international law, concerns the scope of the "high seas" requirement contained in UNCLOS article 101. Specifically, whether piracy under 2014] PIRACY IN SOMALIA 837 UNCLOS article 101(c) requires that an individual facilitate piracy while on the high seas, or whether the law of nations definition of piracy extends to acts of facilitation that occur outside the "high seas," in a state's territorial waters, or even on dry land. Turning to cases before the US Court of Appeals that deal with pirate negotiators, the answer to this question seems settled for the time being. The United States can prosecute pirate negotiators, under a theory of universal jurisdiction-even if they never act on the high seas-so long as their acts facilitated acts of piracy that did occur on the high seas. 207 
a. The Factual Basis for the Prosecution of Mohammad Shibin
The United States prosecuted Mohammad Saaili Shibin for his involvement in two separate pirate attacks. 208 The first incident occurred in May of 2010, when several Somali nationals-not including Shibin himself-attacked and seized the M/V Marida Marguerite, a German-owed vessel with a crew of nineteen Indians, two Bangladeshis, and one Ukrainian. 209 After the initial attack, the Marguerite and its crew of twentytwo were led to an area just off the coast of Somalia and held captive from May to December 2010. 210 During this time, Shibin allegedly came to the Marguerite and proceeded to negotiate a ransom with the ship's owners. 211 Shibin successfully negotiated a ransom with the owners of the Marida Marguerite, and received approximately $30,000 to $50,000 in US currency for his services. 212 The second event occurred on February 19, 2011, when several armed Somali nationals, not including Shibin himself, boarded the S/V Quest, a [Vol. 24:3 US-flagged vessel, took the four US citizens on board as hostages, and then headed toward Somalia. 213 United States military personnel aboard the USS Sterett, a US vessel "located off the coast of Somalia, attempted to secure the release of the hostages through negotiations with several of the hostagetakers." 214 On February 20, 2011, one of the conspirators aboard the Quest purportedly identified Shibin "as the person responsible for negotiating the return of the hostages upon the vessel's arrival in Somalia." 215 "On February 22, 2011, one of the individuals on board the Quest fired a rocket-propelled grenade at the USS Sterett;" then, before Navy Seals could board the vessel, the four hostages were shot and killed. 216 On April 4, 2011, Shibin was taken into custody by foreign forces in Somalia; he was questioned by FBI agents and eventually transported to the United States. 217
b. Procedural History: Indictment, Piracy Counts, and Sentencing of Mohammad Shibin
In a superseding indictment, dated August 17, 2011, Mohammad Shibin was indicted on fifteen counts for his role in the seizure of the Marida Marguerite and the Quest; the indictment included piracy under the law of nations in counts one and seven. 218 On November 1, 2011, Shibin filed a motion to dismiss count one of the superseding indictment. 219 Count one alleged that from in and around May 2010, to in and around January 2011, Shibin committed the crime of piracy as defined under the law of nations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 1651 and 2. 220 Shibin alleged that, under the government's proposed facts, he was only contacted after the Marguerite was seized, and therefore, only actively participated after the substantive offense of piracy had been completed. 221 In other words, Shibin alleged that because he was never personally present on the high seas he was not subject to liability under 18 U.S.C. § § 1651 and 2. 222 Turning to the law of nations definition of piracy at the time of the offense, the government argued that both the 1958 High Seas Convention and the 1982 UNCLOS provide the law of nations definition of piracy; furthermore, both treaties define piracy to include the conduct charged in 213. Shibin, 2012 WL 195012 
2014] PIRACY IN SOMALIA 839
Shibin's case. 223 In particular, the government alleged that under section (3) of the High Seas Convention, and UNCLOS article 101(c), Shibin facilitated acts of violence and detention when he provided negotiation services. 224 In essence, the government alleged that Shibin was a link in the "causal chain" between the physical acts of piracy and the ultimate ransom delivery. 225 More important, for the purposes of this Note, the government argued that the facilitation prong of the piracy definition contained in the High Seas Convention could be satisfied by acts occurring within a State's territorial jurisdiction. 226 Judge Robert Doumar allowed Shibin's case to proceed on all counts, and even ruled against Shibin on motion to suppress statements made while in custody. 227 In April of 2012, a jury convicted Shibin of all fifteen counts contained in the superseding indictment. 228 Subsequently, he was sentenced to ten concurrent and two consecutive life sentences. 229 On December 13, 2012, Shibin filed an appellate brief with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the District Court's ruling on several pre-trial motions. 230 In upholding Shibin's conviction, the Fourth Circuit held that "conduct violating Article 101(c) does not have to be carried out on the high seas, but it must incite or intentionally facilitate acts committed against ships, persons, and property on the high seas." 231
United States v. Ali a. The Factual Background for the Prosecution of Ali Mohamed Ali
The second case concerns charges filed against Ali Mohamed Ali. 232 The charges stem from the hijacking of the M/V CEC Future, a Bahamianflagged cargo ship, owned by Clipper Group A/S, a Danish company. 233 On November 7, 2008, the CEC Future was seized by Somali pirates as it was sailing in the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of Yemen. 234 The government further alleges that Ali negotiated a ransom of $1.7 million for the release of the ship, and that he also negotiated a separate payment of $75,000 for himself. 238 On May 29, 2012, Ali filed a motion to dismiss counts one through four of the indictment. 244 245 The court dismissed count one, conspiracy to commit piracy, for failure to state an offense because conspiracy was not in the UNCLOS definition. 246 The court allowed count two, aiding and abetting, to proceed because it found that 18 U.S.C. § § 1651 and 2 were the functional equivalent of UNCLOS article 101(c). 247 However, the Court narrowed the piracy and aiding and abetting offense of count two, concluding: "[i]t will be the government's burden to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Ali intentionally facilitated acts of piracy while he was on the high seas." 248 It denied Ali's motion in all other respects. 249 At the outset of the case it seemed a foregone conclusion that the government would be able to show that Ali facilitated piracy while on the high seas. Initially, on June 11, 2012, the government stated: "the evidence will show that [Ali] was acting as a negotiator for the pirates while the CEC Future was on the high seas." 250 However, at a status hearing conducted July 20, 2012, the government had revised its position, contending instead that "Ali boarded the CEC Future on November 9, 2008, in territorial waters, and that the CEC Future then sailed through international waters for a matter of 'minutes'. . . before stopping in Somali waters near Eyl, where it remained for the duration of the incident." 251 In light of the government's change in position, District Court Judge Ellen Huevelle stated that she was misled by a government claim that Ali was in international waters. 252 In fact, Judge Huevelle went further to call the prosecution's dramatic change in position "unbelievably inexcusable behavior." 253 In a memorandum opinion issued after the status hearing on July 20, Judge Huevelle vacated Section II(D) of the July 13 opinion and dismissed courts three and four. 254 The government filed an emergency motion with the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit seeking an immediate stay of the district court's release order, and an order returning Ali to custody pending an appeal of the District Court's release order. 256 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted the government's motion, and, without issuing an opinion, instructed Judge Huvelle to return Ali to custody pending trial. 257 Judge Huvelle issued the order and Ali was returned to custody by the Department of Corrections. 258 Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled on an appeal by the US Government regarding Judge Huvelle's decision to dismiss, in part, charges of aiding and abetting piracy. It held that the prosecution of someone for the crime of aiding and abetting piracy, based on acts not committed on the high seas, was consistent with the law of nations. 259
B. The Text of UNCLOS, the Legislative History of 18 U.S.C. § § 1651 and 2, and Consideration of International Law: A Comparative Analysis of the Arguments Presented in U.S. v. Shibin and U.S. v. Ali
Those wishing to impose a "high seas" requirement (supporters of the high seas requirement), including Mohammad Shibin, 260 have made several arguments suggesting that the government should be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual facilitated piracy while on the high seas to procure a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § § 1651 and 2. On the other hand, those who oppose requiring the government to satisfy a "high seas" requirement (opponents of the high seas requirement), such as the US Government, suggest that 18 U.S.C. § § 1651 and 2 can apply to conduct that occurs beyond the high seas because UNCLOS article 101(c) does not explicitly mention the "high seas." Both sides of the debate have supported their respective positions with a combination of arguments focusing on the text of UNCLOS article 101, legislative history, and general principles of international law. 261 Ultimately, at the US appellate level, the law has been settled with respect to pirate negotiators: the US Government does not need to prove that negotiators facilitated piracy while on the high seas, even when universal jurisdiction is the theory used to prosecute the negotiator. 
The Text of UNCLOS Article 101
The strongest argument for opponents of the "high seas" requirement focuses on a plain language comparison between the text of UNCLOS article 101(a) and the text of article 101(c). 262 Article 101(a) designates as piracy "illegal acts of violence or detention . . . committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas . . . ." 263 On the other hand, UNCLOS article 101(c) defines piracy as "any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)." 264 Article 101(a) specifically includes "high seas" language, but article 101(c) excludes such "high seas" language. 265 Opponents of a high seas requirement argue that if a high seas requirement were imputed to article 101(c), then the "high seas" language contained in the first definition of piracy would be rendered ineffectual. 266 Because statutory construction mandates an interpretation that ensures that statutory language is not rendered meaningless, then the lack of a high seas requirement in article 101(c) must be interpreted as an intentional omission. 267 Absence of "high seas" language in article 101(c) is strong evidence that acts of pirate facilitation can occur outside of the high seas. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit put it, "[e]xplicit geographical limits-'on the high seas' and 'outside the jurisdiction of any state'-govern piratical acts under article 101(a)(i) and (ii). Such language is absent, however, in article 101(c), strongly suggesting a facilitative act need not occur on the high seas so long as its predicate offense has." 268 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted article 101(a) and article 101(c) as creating separate offenses: [Vol. 24:3
The text of Article 101 describes one class of acts involving violence, detention, and depredation of ships on the high seas and another class of acts that facilitate those acts. In this way, Article 101 reaches all the piratical conduct, wherever carried out, so long as the acts specified in Article 101(a) are carried out on the high seas. 269 Scholars who argue that article 101(c) does implicitly contain a high seas requirement counter with a textual argument considering the text of UNCLOS in its entirety. 270 For example, article 86 provides that the provisions contained in Part VII on the High Seas-the part that contains the article 101 definition of piracy-"apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State." 271 Article 86 further provides: "[t]his article does not entail any abridgment of the freedoms enjoyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone in accordance with article 58." 272 Both the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Fourth Circuit rejected this argument largely because reading a high seas requirement into article 101(c) would result in numerous redundancies throughout UNCLOS. 273 A better reading of article 86, according to the US appellate courts, interprets the article in an introductory, or definitional role, for the portions of UNCLOS dealing with issues pertaining to the high seas. 274 Likewise, article 100 provides a duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy, but includes an explicit high seas requirement: "states shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas . . . ." 275 Article 105 makes a similar reference to the "high seas." It provides: "[o]n the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship . . . taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board." 276 Based on the explicit high seas requirement found in articles 86, 100, and 105, supporters argue that a high seas requirement should be imputed to UNCLOS article 101(c) as a prerequisite for any exercise of universal jurisdiction. 277 
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PIRACY IN SOMALIA 845 again rejected this argument, reasoning that article 105's reference to the "high seas highlights the broad authority of nations to apprehend pirates even in international waters." 278 Considering the text of UNCLOS article 101(c), in juxtaposition to the text of article 101(a), it appears as though no high seas requirement exists for those individuals who merely "incite" or "intentional[ly] facilitate" acts of piracy. 279 Indeed, a plain language reading of the text of UNCLOS article 101 was dispositive for the Fourth Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals. 280
Legislative History: 18 U.S.C. § 2 and the Charming Betsy Cannon
Supporters of the high seas requirement argue that Congress did not intend for § 2 to apply to acts of general piracy. Indeed, the district court in U.S. v. Ali analyzed the legislative history behind 18 U.S.C. § 2 to suggest that Congress did not intend for § 2 to broaden the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1651 to include facilitation in foreign territorial waters. 281 This line of argument supports the position held by those wishing to impose a high seas requirement because it favors a narrower reading of 18 U.S.C. § § 1651 and 2.
Supporters of the high seas requirement reason that both 18 U.S.C. § 1651 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 have their origin in the Crimes Act of 1790; § 1651 originates from section 8 and § 2 originates from section 10 of that Act respectively. 282 In 1818, the Supreme Court in United States v. Palmer reasoned that the piracy provisions contained in the Crimes Act of 1790 did not include the acts of foreigners aboard foreign vessels traversing the high seas. 283 In particular, the Court analyzed section 10 which, by its language, purported to apply to "any person": It will scarcely be denied that the words "any person," when applied to aiding or advising a fact, are as extensive as the same words when applied to the commission of that fact. Can it be believed that the legislature intended to punish with death the subject of a foreign prince, who, within the dominions of that prince, should advise a person, Subsequently, Congress passed the Act of March 3, 1819, which criminalized not only piratical acts with a nexus to the United States, but also piracy as an international offense subject to universal jurisdiction. 285 Supporters of the high seas requirement note that while Congress revised section 8 to include general piracy, Congress did not revise section 10; therefore, Congress did not revise the Palmer Court's holding that section 10 applied as a municipal statute. 286 Because Congress had the opportunity to revise section 10-which is § 2's predecessor-in the Act of 1819, but chose not to, it stands to reason that Congress does not intend for the modern § 2 to apply to general piracy. 287 The Charming Betsy cannon presumes that Congress does not intend to violate international law, so that an ambiguous statute must be construed so that it does not violate the "law of nations." 288 When universal jurisdiction is the basis for a court's jurisdiction over a particular matter, the court must determine whether the charged conduct falls within the international law definition of a universal jurisdiction crime; otherwise it would violate international law, and consequently the Charming Betsy cannon as well. 289 As discussed supra in Part III, UNCLOS article 101 provides the international law definition of piracy. 290 UNCLOS provides that 'any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating" an act of piracy is itself piracy' as defined by UNCLOS Article 101(c)." 291 Furthermore, "[u]nder domestic law, 18 U.S.C. § 2 makes those who aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, procure, or willfully cause the commission of a federal crime punishable as a principle." 292 The court in Ali reasoned that the aiding and abetting charge in count two was functionally equivalent to the definition contained in UNCLOS article 101(c); therefore, it permitted the charge to proceed. 293 However, because of the Charming Betsy cannon, the Ali court reasoned that the government must prove "that Ali intentionally facilitated acts of piracy while he was on the high seas. 
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On the other hand, opponents of the high seas requirement, including the federal prosecutors in United States v. Shibin and the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, reason that 18 U.S.C. § § 1651 and 2 apply extraterritorially by virtue of their plain meaning. 295 Opponents of the "high seas" requirement argue that Congress intended 18 U.S.C. § 1651 to apply extraterritorially because it defined piracy by reference to the "law of nations" which can evolve over time. 296 The government has argued that, where Congress has expressed a clear intent for a criminal statue to apply extraterritorially, it is unnecessary for the courts to consider customary international law because Congress has the power to create legislation that violates international law. 297 The government in Shibin argued that the acts of those pirates who physically act on the high seas are clearly prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1651, through reference to UNCLOS article 101, while those who participate in the act of piracy are equally culpable under 18 U.S.C. § 2 by reference to UNCLOS article 101(c). 298 Opponents of the high seas requirement argue that US domestic jurisdiction is consistent with the universal jurisdiction under customary international law, and international law prohibits acts of facilitation. 299 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found this argument persuasive: "[b]ecause international law permits prosecuting acts of aiding and abetting piracy committed while not on the high seas, the Charming Betsy canon is no constraint on the scope of Count Two." 300
The Competing Interest of International Law: Expediency vs. The Requirements of Customary International Law Under UNCLOS article 101
Another argument articulated by opponents of the high seas requirement centers on the practical benefits of prosecuting those who facilitate acts of piracy from Somali territorial waters. The necessity of stopping the scourge of piracy, the argument suggests, should weigh strongly in favor of not imposing a high seas requirement. 301 Second, federal prosecutors could read the holdings in Shibin and Ali in a narrow manner as establishing the legal basis for prosecuting pirate negotiators, but not establishing the basis for prosecuting all those individuals associated with acts of piracy committed on the high seas. Under this view, the United States would begin prosecuting pirate negotiators-assuming personal jurisdiction can be achieved-but would not attempt to prosecute the investors, kingpins, and political elite whose acts not only make piracy possible, but profitable too. 319 
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Third, and the position taken by this Note, federal prosecutors in the United States could interpret the holdings of Shibin and Ali as establishing the legal basis for prosecuting pirate negotiators consistent with principles of international law and universal jurisdiction, but treat the cases as anomalies. The cases are anomalous insofar as they allow the United States to prosecute individuals whose acts only indirectly affected the United States and who may have never entered the high seas. Under this view, federal prosecutors would recognize their legal authority to prosecute negotiators, instigators, and kingpins, but choose not to exercise the full range of their authority. Instead, US authorities would exercise prosecutorial discretion by electing to prosecute only individuals acting on the high seas while deferring the prosecution of high-ranking pirates to the larger international community.
On a whole, the holdings in Ali and Shibin at the federal appellate level serve as victories for federal prosecutors. However, this Note interprets those cases as anomalies. When the only basis for jurisdiction is universality, federal prosecutors should only prosecute an individual who facilitates acts of piracy if that individual acts while on the high seas. 323 First, this policy would adhere more closely to the policy rationales underlying universal jurisdiction. Second, it would foster respect for Somali territorial jurisdiction by deferring to the larger international community to prosecute the high-ranking pirates.
A. The Rationale Behind the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction
The rationale underlying the theory of universal jurisdiction favors imposing discretionary limitations on prosecutions conducted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § § 1651 and 2. Opponents of the high seas requirement have argued that, because pirate negotiators facilitate indiscriminate acts of piracy that occur on the high seas, and because the pirates acting on the high seas do not discriminate against their victim's nationality, then all states have an interest in prosecuting both the pirates committing the acts of violence, and the negotiators involved. 324 This argument, however, is at odds with one of the most longstanding principles behind the crime of piracy-that the crime of piracy, as an international crime, is subject to the jurisdiction of all states. 325 323. To be sure, the situation would be much different if the United States had a direct interest in the prosecution. If the captive ship were a US-flagged vessel, for example, then the United States would have a greater incentive to prosecute all those who facilitated the act of piracy. However, when the basis for jurisdiction is universality, then the connection becomes more tenuous, and the United States has less of an incentive to prosecute individuals acting from locations other than the high seas.
324 When piracy occurs on the high seas every state has an interest in seeing the perpetrator prosecuted, but no individual state has territorial jurisdiction. 326 When a pirate boss finances a piracy operation while in the territorial jurisdiction of Somalia, the United States-with no jurisdictional nexus to the act of piracy-would be violating this rationale by prosecuting him on a theory of universal jurisdiction. One who acts from within the territorial jurisdiction of a state is, by definition, still subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the state within which the act occurred. 327 To be sure, multiple states may assert competing claims to jurisdiction over a single criminal act. 328 Even though Somalia may lack the resources or political will to prosecute pirates acting from within its territorial waters, it still has jurisdiction over these criminal acts. 329 To be clear, the flag state 330 of the victim ship, the state to which the crew members belong, or the state of Somalia itself, may have jurisdiction over acts occurring in Somali territorial waters. In fact, UNCLOS article 100 contemplates a duty for all states to cooperate in the repression of piracy. 331 Consequently, if Somalia has territorial jurisdiction over acts that occur within its territorial waters and the only basis for US jurisdiction is a theory of universal jurisdictionwithout any closer jurisdictional nexus-then a US prosecution would impinge the territorial sovereignty of Somalia. 332 Second, one might argue that the exercise of universal jurisdiction over higher-ups in the piracy hierarchy can be rationalized under a "denationalization" theory, or the notion that when an individual commits an act of piracy he or she relinquishes his or her nationality. 333 The "denationalization" theory, however, also fails to explain how universal jurisdiction can extend into Somali territorial waters. The "denationalization" theory is premised on the notion that an act of piracy obviates an individual's nationality, and therefore, removes the ability of a state to prosecute that individual under a national basis of jurisdiction. 334 Turning to U.S. v. Ali as an example, the "de-nationalization" theory makes 2014] PIRACY IN SOMALIA 853 little sense as a basis for universal jurisdiction. More than a year after Ali negotiated a ransom from the Clipper Group, he was appointed General of the Ministry of Education in Somaliland. 335 In light of Ali's position of prominence in Somaliland in June of 2010, it seems improbable to suggest that he somehow ceased to be a citizen of Somalia after he negotiated a ransom in January of 2009. In fact, piracy is such a ubiquitous profession in Somalia that it is hard to image that any Somali pirate loses citizenship merely by participating in acts of piracy. 336 The "de-nationalization" theory falls short of explaining how universal jurisdiction is applicable to pirate negotiators, or more importantly those individuals who act from the Somali mainland to enable piracy. Both the geographic limitation and the "de-nationalization" rationales for universal jurisdiction fail to explain how universal jurisdiction should be exercised over pirate enablers. Indeed, the opposite seems true: the geographic rationale for universal jurisdiction only seems to gain traction when it is limited to the "high seas." The traditional rationales for exercising universal jurisdiction favor limiting prosecutions to acts that occur on the high seas.
B. Respecting Somali Territorial Jurisdiction by Deferring to the International Community
As a matter of international policy, using US federal courts to prosecute acts of intentional facilitation that occur within the territorial waters of a state, or on a state's mainland, seems to invade the providence of Somali sovereignty and has the potential to produce absurd results. Opponents of the high seas requirement have argued that extending liability to those "inciting or intentionally facilitating" 337 piracy on dry land could allow prosecutors to charge pirate financiers and kingpins with the crime of piracy. 338 The cases of U.S. v. Shibin and U.S. v. Ali seem to provide a strong legal basis for this position. 339 At first glance, the benefits of prosecuting individuals higher up on the piracy hierarchy may seem enticing-such prosecutions would provide a significant disincentive to finance piracy operations by effectively attacking piracy at its source. 340 
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PIRACY IN SOMALIA 855 for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia. . . ." 348 This resolution is violated when the United States prosecutes individuals for acts that occur solely within Somali territorial jurisdiction and from within the Somali mainland. Second, allowing states to exercise universal jurisdiction over acts occurring in territorial jurisdictions diminishes predictability by erasing a clear end to liability. Pirate financing often occurs through a pirate committee which is comprised of investors and commanders who help prepare and carry out both sea and terrestrial operations. 349 Often, accountants support the investors and managers while the actual pirate operations are supplied by Somali cooks. 350 Under the broad jurisdictional interpretation offered by the government in Shibin an accountant on the Somali mainland who tabulates and distributes profits for a pirate financier has seemingly "aid[ed]" in piracy under 18 U.S.C. § § 1651 and 2. Likewise, a Somali cook living in Mogadishu, who prepares food for a piracy raid, could, if brought into the United States, be convicted of "aiding"ipiracy under 18 U.S.C. § § 1651 and 2. 351 These hypothetical scenarios highlight the anomalous nature of the holdings in United States v. Ali and United States v. Shibin.
If liability can extend to individuals who act on dry land, there is a concern about the discretionary power of a state to expand liability to acts that have traditionally not been considered piracy. As Chief Justice John Marshall put it:
A pirate, under the laws of nations, is an enemy of the human race. Being the enemy of all, he is liable to be punished by all. . . . But piracy, under the law of nations, which alone is punishable by all nations, can only consist in an act which is an offense against all. No particular nation can increase or diminish the list of offenses thus punishable. 352 To be sure, the question of whether to prosecute a pirate accountant or a Somali cook is still a matter of prosecutorial discretion, pursuant to money laundering regulations and implementing regional programs, aimed at disrupting financial flows into piracy networks. 361 The United States should defer to the international community because the cost of combating piracy is very high, and because the international community, through organizations like Working Group 5, is better poised to fight the scourge of piracy on the Somali mainland.
Outlining a specific, international plan to deal with the prosecution of "white-collar" acts of pirates is well beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note recommends that the United States consider some of the potential deleterious effects of relying on a theory of universal jurisdiction to prosecute high-ranking pirates who never personally act on the high seas. Such a consideration favors limiting piracy prosecutions to those individuals who act on the high seas.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States should exercise discretion and defer to the international community to prosecute high-ranking pirates. Although the United States has an interest in prosecuting pirate negotiators, kingpins, and financiers, the policy rationale for universal jurisdiction, a respect for Somali territorial jurisdiction, and practical concerns about the sustainability of prosecuting high-ranking pirates all favor deference to a unified international solution. To be sure, the benefits of prosecuting highranking pirates are appealing at first blush; however, this Note raises some cautionary advice-relying on universal jurisdiction to combat Somali piracy may, in some circumstances, undermine the very international framework the United States seeks to uphold.
